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Extensive analyses of Marine Le Pen’s media interventions as leader of the French Front National have 
revealed mostly rhetorical differences from her father’s discourse. In particular, despite Marine Le Pen’s 
professed openness toward women and their policy concerns, and despite her professed intention to 
transform the FN into party suitable for government, there has been little progress in these directions.  
However, the FN’s visual discourse has been all but ignored by the scholarly analysis, despite the fact that 
campaign visuals encode significant social and political information. This paper finds that the FN 
candidates’ visual presentation has undergone major transformations from the 2007 to the 2012 legislative 
elections. Specifically FN candidates in 2012 are more likely to visually portray themselves like 
mainstream party candidates. Compared to the 2007 elections, women candidates, in particular, were more 
likely to visually promote their personal qualities in 2012, in some respects more than 2012 men 
candidates.  
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The skyrocketing electoral support for the Front National (FN) in France since 2007 has raised 
questions about the FN’s ability of becoming a mainstream party. Perhaps the most important 
question is what (if anything) has changed with the transfer of leadership from Jean-Marie to 
Marine Le Pen? This question has been often examined with respect to the new FN discourse. 
Several systematic analyses have revealed mainly cosmetic differences in the speeches of the two 
leaders (e.g. Alduy & Wahnich 2015; Fourest & Venner, 2012). For example, Marine Le Pen has 
professed more openness to various categories of voters previously shunned by the party 
leadership, such as women, and she has vowed to make the FN a governing party. In-depth 
discourse and policy analyses, however, have revealed that these promises have been mostly 
empty to date. The current FN policies toward women have not evolved substantially from the 
traditional FN line (Crépon, 2012; Alduy & Wahnich, 2015); and the party’s policy positions still 
place it in the niche party category (Ivaldi, 2015). 
However, the evolution of the FN’s visual discourse has been all but ignored. Visuals are 
processed automatically, and contain important social information (Grabe & Bucy, 2009; Kress 
& Van Leeuwen, 2006). More importantly for a party’s electoral strategy, the visual choices 
candidates make in their electoral posters send a signal about their party’s claimed political status 
(Dumitrescu, 2010, 2009). Specifically, previous research found that mainstream party candidates 
draw more attention to themselves and demand a personal vote; while candidates of niche parties 
put the party in front, and themselves more in the background (Dumitrescu 2010, 2009). These 
visual strategies correlate with electoral success, suggesting that they are taken as credible signals 
by voters (Dumitrescu, 2010). In other words, candidates can therefore use their visual campaign 
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materials to convey valuable information about their party, about their own qualities and about 
their policy positions. 
The goal of this paper is to examine to what extent some of the promises of change 
professed by Marine Le Pen, while not implemented in the spoken discourse, are reflected in the 
FN’s visual campaign strategy. Specifically, we study the evolution of candidates’ personal 
images in the 2007 and 2012 legislative elections (the former being the last election under the 
helm of Jean-Marie, and the latter being the first legislative election under the leadership of 
Marine Le Pen). Since Marine Le Pen has professed softening the party’s traditionalist image 
with regard to women’s role in society, we focus particularly on the evolution of women 
candidates. The paper examines some of the campaign documents that are likely to touch all 
French voters: candidates’ profession de foi (political programs mailed to all registered voters).  
We begin by presenting the evidence on the (lack of) change in the FN positions during 
Marine Le Pen’s leadership, and by laying out the research questions about the corresponding 
changes in visual strategy. We then introduce the theoretical basis for the analysis of the visuals 
in candidates’ professions de foi, and formulate the study’s hypotheses. The analysis and results 
follow, including sensitivity checks on the results. We conclude with a larger discussion about 
the implication of these results.  
 
Front National from Jean-Marie to Marine Le Pen: Conflicting signs of change  
The Front National is the main party occupying the extreme right of the ideological spectrum in 
France. The data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015a, 2015b; Hooghe et al., 
2010; Steenbergen & Marks, 2007) give a good overview of its ideological position. According 
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to experts, the FN was percentile 94.5 in 1997, percentile 99 in 2002 and in 2007 and percentile 
98.77 in 2012 on the general left-right scale among all European parties. The lowest percentile 
the FN has ever occupied on the Libertarian (Post-materialist) - Traditional (Authoritarian) scale 
was 93.4 in 2012. The scale where the FN was ranked closer to the center has been the economic 
dimension of the left-right continuum; on this dimension, the party has been percentile 97.5 in 
1997, percentile 67.1 in 2002, percentile 75.9 in 2007, and again percentile 62.96 in 2012. Thus, 
with some variations, but admittedly small ones, the party has been as far from the French and 
European ideological center as possible in the past 20 years.  
Unlike the ideological placement, the party’s electoral score has fluctuated considerably. 
It scored almost 15% at the legislative elections in 1997, a bit above 11% in 2002, failed to go 
over the 5% mark in 2007 and was again third in the 2012 legislative elections, with almost 14% 
of the vote. The party also performed well in Presidential elections. As its leader, Jean-Marie Le 
Pen went into the second round in 2002. Following a disappointing performance by her father in 
2007, Marine Le Pen went on to score almost 18% of the vote in the first round of the 2012 
presidential elections. While failing to qualify for the second round, this percentage was 
nonetheless larger than in 2002. Moreover, the 2012 elections saw a substantial increase in 
women’s support: for the first time, women were almost as likely as men to vote FN (17.5% 
compared to 19%, Mayer, 2015, p. 309). 
In light of increasing FN support, the consequences of the leadership transition have been 
widely debated (e.g. Crépon 2012; Crépon, Dézé & Mayer, 2015; Alduy & Wahnich 2015; 
Fourest & Venner, 2012). Jean-Marie Le Pen was the epitome of the nationalistic, xenophobic, 
homophobic, authoritarian, traditional right (see Crépon 2015, p.191; Taguieff, 1996 for a 
thorough discussion of his political and social discourse). Especially with regard to women, his 
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public interventions left no doubt that he considered their place to be at home raising their many 
kids, and not in the public realm (cf. Taguieff, 1996; Alduy & Wahnich 2015, p. 53). There is a 
consensus among the experts that his daughter Marine however, has attempted to move the party 
away from these controversial positions.  
Marine Le Pen signaled a change in discourse in one of the first speeches as the new head 
of the party, on May 1
st
 2011. This speech extended a friendly hand to all the categories that had 
previously had a lower or no place at all among the Front National supporters: women, gays and 
non-Christians (Jews, Muslims, or non-believers). According to the new party line, being French 
was all that mattered, and this superseded any other personal characteristic. At the same time, this 
openness failed to generate policy changes (e.g. Dézé, 2012, Fourest & Venner, 2012; Crépon, 
2012, 2015). For one, Crépon (2012) notes that the FN 2012 political program contained no 
specific provisions protecting or extending women’s rights. Under the previous party doctrine, 
women were supposed to play mainly a family role, as mothers, and this role was not repudiated 
after 2011. Rather, judging from the interviews presented by Crépon (2012, chapter 5) with FN 
members, the FN has taken more women-friendly positions, simply because it has ceased to 
contest certain women rights that are by now already enshrined in the French public 
consciousness, such as the right to having an abortion. Thus, rather than a true move towards 
more mainstream politics with respect to the place of women in society, the FN under Marine Le 
Pen simply relented on its contestation of some mainstream political values.  
The “normalisation” of the party line, meaning the shift toward more mainstream politics, 
has been contested not just with regard to its view of women, but also with respect to other areas 
of politics. There has clearly been a shift in discourse and policy programs, away from cultural 
and nationalistic issues and more focused on economic and social issues (Ivaldi, 2015; Alduy & 
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Wahnich 2015). However, even with this shift, the data shows that the post-2011 FN gives 
significantly higher policy weight to cultural issues (e.g. religion, immigration and security) and 
significantly less weight to economic and social issues than the typical mainstream party. 
Moreover, looking at particular policies, Dézé (2012, pp.148-155) points out that the 2012 party 
program deviated little or not at all from the traditional FN positions: the party still rejected other 
mainstream parties, immigration policies, the European Union, globalization, and advocated a 
very strong state. As such, the party has maintained its niche party status despite the leadership 
change (Ivaldi, 2015, p. 167-8).  
A systematic analysis of Marine Le Pen’s public interventions comes to the same 
conclusion: the differences between hers and her father’s discourse are often rhetorical, to make 
the same traditional values more palatable for younger generations (Fourest & Venner, 2012). 
Thus,  Alduy and Wahnich (2015, p. 54) note that while Marine le Pen does not talk as frequently 
as her father about abortion (implicitly acknowledging this right), she has never used expressions 
such as “equality between men and women” or “women’s fight (cause des femmes).” Crépon, 
Dézé and Mayer (2015, p. 529) conclude that “the FN of Marine Le Pen is certainly not the one 
of Jean-Marie le Pen. But it is not substantially different either.”  
At the same time, political observers agree that unlike her father, Marine has often 
professed her desire to get the FN in government (Gaultier, 2015; Goldhammer, 2015). Gaultier 
(2015, p.107) cites a 2014 interview given to the journal Valeurs Actuelles, in which she openly 
declares her “[fight] even before she took the helm of the movement, to make the FN a governing 
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party.”1 And it is undeniable that the party’s broadening electoral base brings it closer to Marine 
Le Pen’s governing ideal.  
How the party managed to increase its support in legislative elections, especially among 
women (Mayer, 2015, p. 309), is therefore an open question. The question is even more puzzling 
when considering that previous good performances in presidential elections did not have the same 
effect. In 2002, Jean-Marie Le Pen was unable to translate his presidential success into 
substantially better scores for his party. In fact, his party lost votes compared to the 1997 
elections. In 2012, the party’s legislative success suggests that Marine Le Pen managed very well 
to persuade voters of change, despite not altering the traditional FN line much. Yet, while many 
have looked at her words, no study to date has looked at the changing visual strategy of her party. 
As images convey important social information (Grabe & Bucy, 2009), this paper examines the 
changes in the visual presentation of FN candidates from one election to the other.  In light of the 
party’s increased success and Marine Le Pen’s changing rhetoric from her father’s with regard to 
women and their concerns, we need to consider two questions:  
RQ 1: Do FN candidates  use different visual promotion strategies in 2007 and 2012?  
RQ 2: Do men and women candidates use different visual promotion strategies in 
2007 and in 2012? 
The next section discusses the best party strategies for rallying voters, and how these 
strategies are reflected in visual campaigns.  
                                                     
1
 This quote reflects Marine Le Pen’s evolving role in the FN after 2000. The leadership change in 2011 was the 
conclusion of a long gradual political process, rather than a disruptive event, as Marine Le Pen was here father’s 
general campaign director in 2007. However, despite her increasing political involvement, Jean-Marie Le Pen was 
still the official face of the FN until his retirement as leader, and Marine Le Pen’s speeches signaling a change in the 
traditional party line became more prominent after her accession to the helm of the party. 
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Mainstream vs. niche parties: Different optimal strategies  
Previous studies suggest that mainstream parties and issue-based parties have different optimal 
electoral strategies (Adams, Clark, Ezrow, & Glasgow, 2006; Ezrow, 2008). According to Adams 
et al. (2006), niche parties (extreme right parties included) benefit from advocating increased 
ideological purity, while mainstream parties (such as the Conservatives or Christian Democrats 
on the right) benefit from broadening their appeal to as many voters as possible. When parties 
follow an inappropriate strategy (either broadening their appeal, for niche parties; or narrowing it, 
for a mainstream party), they lose votes (Adams et al., 2006, p.524). Ezrow (2008) presents 
additional evidence that extreme ideological parties gain more from following a niche policy 
strategy, in other words, from resisting any temptation of opening up to other voter groups.  
One strategy to broaden voter support is to market candidates’ personal qualities. At first 
sight, this strategy could fit any party type, but there are several reasons why mainstream parties 
are more likely to apply it. Since the optimal niche party strategy is to emphasize the party and its 
ideology over the candidates, a marketing strategy focused on the person of the local candidate is 
difficult to reconcile with such an emphasis (unless, of course, the candidate is in fact the party 
leader). Moreover, due to the French single-member-district, two-round-majority electoral 
system, candidates with a winning chance have a clear incentive to search for a personal vote 
(Shugard & Carrey, 1995), especially as significant voter volatility leads to sizable numbers of 
marginal seats (Kreuzer & Stephan, 2003, p. 133). There are several reasons why in practice 
candidates with a winning chance are seldom niche party candidates or political newcomers. On 
the one hand, the second round is often an affair contested by the two main mainstream parties on 
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the left (the Socialists) and right (the Union for a Popular Movement until recently, now renamed 
as The Republicans); thus, the incentive for seeking a personal vote is generally particularly 
strong for candidates of these mainstream parties (Kreuzer, 2000). On the other hand, when 
mainstream candidates are not the only ones contesting the second round, they are often joined by 
local notables, politicians who are deeply entrenched in politics, as there is a tradition of 
cumulating local and national offices (Elgie, 2005).   
In short, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons (grounded in the specific features 
of the French electoral system) as to why a strategy focused on promoting the personal qualities 
of the local candidates should be followed by mainstream and not by niche parties (assuming, of 
course, that parties want to follow the optimal strategies maximizing their electoral support).  
 
The grammar of visual election messages 
Previous research has shown that visual communication is a rich source of political information, 
especially with regard to politicians (Grabe & Bucy, 2009; see Dumitrescu, 2016, for a review). 
For example, individuals take cues about politicians’ policy positions from the groups they 
observe in their election ads (Swigger, 2012). Viewers have been repeatedly shown to respond to 
politicians’ expressions of affect, even to fleeting facial muscles movements (e.g. Stewart, 
Waller, & Schubert, 2009). Moreover, voters have been shown to make automatic judgements 
about a politician’s character based on their looks and facial features (e.g., Rosenberg Bohan, 
McCafferty, & Harris, 1986; Rosenberg, Kahn, & Tran, 1991; Hall, Goren, Chaiken, & Todorov, 
2009). Thus, because of their richness in information, visuals are an important communication 
channel to consider when considering electoral strategies.    
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When viewers observe a picture, they make up a story and interpret the elements of the 
picture using certain simple rules. While these rules have been discussed at length elsewhere 
(Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2006; Dumitrescu, 2010, 2009) we note here only the most important 
ones:  
 First, how big an element is in the picture suggests how important it is in general. For 
example, if the candidate image takes only little space in an electoral material, less than 
the space taken by the party name and/or their slogan, then the electoral material signals 
that the person of the candidate is of secondary importance (as compared to their party 
affiliation and program). The relationship between display size and politician importance 
has been found in at least two political communication contexts: newspapers (Barrett & 
Barrington, 2005) and election posters (Dumitrescu, 2010).  
 Second, the close-up of a person in a picture indicates social closeness (Kress & Van 
Leeuwen, 2006). The closer the picture is, the closer the person appears to the viewer. 
Since we keep strangers at (least at) arm’s length, we feel a more personal connection 
with those pictured in a close-up, than with those who are pictured from more far away 
(provided of course, that the context of the picture is positive). 
 Third, an element’s importance is judged also by its placement in the image (Kress & Van 
Leeuwen, 2006). Elements placed more to the center and more to the top are given 
priority compared to those placed closer to the margins or lower.   
Previous evidence suggests that the personal vote seeking strategy in France translates in 
specific visual communication choices that can be decoded with the rules described earlier. 
Dumitrescu (2010) analyzed election posters from French party candidates in the 2007 legislative 
elections, and found that mainstream party candidates consistently featured themselves larger on 
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their posters than niche party candidates, as well as more to the top and more to the center. 
Conversely, candidates of niche parties, whose best strategy was to express ideological purity, 
placed the visual emphasis on their party’s program. Moreover, these visual choices were 
correlated with candidate poll success in the direction dictated by their party’s status.  
Marine Le Pen has claimed wanting to bring the FN in position to take the reins of 
government, but according to all evidence, she has made limited ideological changes to the 
program. As a result, the party is, by all accounts, still in the niche category, while, at the same 
time, being significantly more popular. Given the previous research on mainstream and niche 
parties’ strategies, and on visual grammar, we are now able to develop our hypotheses with 
respect to our two research questions.   
 
Hypotheses  
RQ 1: Do FN candidates use different visual promotion strategies in 2007 and 2012?  
The main expectation is that FN candidates in 2012 present themselves more as 
candidates of a mainstream party. That is, we expect them to try to attract more personal votes, 
using a more candidate-focused visual style. More precisely: 
H1a: Candidates in 2012 picture themselves larger on their campaign materials than 2007 
candidates. 
H1b: Candidates in 2012 appear closer to voters than 2007 candidates. 
H1c: Candidates in 2012 picture themselves more to the center on their campaign 
materials than 2007 candidates. 
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H1d: Candidates in 2012 picture themselves more to the top on their campaign materials 
than 2007 candidates. 
RQ 2: Do men and women candidates use different visual promotion strategies in 2007 and 
in 2012? 
We expect to observe significant changes in the comparative presentation of men and 
women candidates from the 2007 to the 2012 elections. Specifically, because of Jean Marie Le 
Pen’s traditionalist views, and because of Marine Le Pen’s professed openness to women voters, 
we expect FN women candidates in 2012 to visually promote themselves more than women 
candidates in 2007. To counteract the masculine FN image cultivated by Jean Marie Le Pen, we 
also expect women candidates in 2012 to visually promote themselves more than men running in 
the same election. 
H2a: Compared to 2007, women candidates in 2012 picture themselves larger on their 
campaign materials. 
H2b: Compared to 2007, women candidates in 2012 appear closer to voters. 
H2c: Compared to 2007, women candidates in 2012 feature more to the center on their 
campaign materials. 
H2d: Compared to 2007, women candidates in 2012 feature more to the top on their 
campaign materials. 
H2e: Women candidates in 2012 feature larger on their campaign materials than men 
candidates.  
H2f: Women candidates in 2012 appear closer to voters than men candidates. 
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H2g: Women candidates in 2012 feature more to the center on their campaign materials 
than men candidates. 
H2h: Women candidates in 2012 feature more to the top on their campaign materials than 
men candidates. 
Data 
a. Candidate campaign materials 
The French electoral law requires all candidates to produce a document reflecting their election 
pledges (called “profession de foi,” hereafter referred to as PF). These documents are sent to a 
central office that has them distributed them to all registered voters at the expense of state. This 
arrangement ensures that voters get a minimum of information about all the candidates, and that 
all the candidates can reach all the voters in the district by means of these particular documents.  
This paper analyzes the covers of the PFs of Front National candidates in the first rounds 
of the 2007 and 2012 legislative elections. This focus on the cover is justified by the fact that this 
aspect of the PF is the most likely to touch every voter, irrespective of their party preference, as 
no browsing is necessary.  
In both years, FN candidates’ PFs consisted in a two-page document (one double-sided 
sheet). The general format was similar across years: the top cover was taken by the candidates’ 
picture, and it was the only part of the PF that candidates could personalize. The reverse side was 
reserved for the party’s ideological positions, and was identical for all the candidates.   
In addition to displaying the candidate’s picture, the cover contained additional 
information that was identical for all the candidates in a year. There are some interesting 
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differences between the information included in 2007 and 2012.
2
 In 2007, there was a slogan 
“France and the French first” (“La France et les français d’abord!”) followed by the candidate’s 
name, his or her occupation and/or family status, and then one or several paragraphs reflecting 
the party’s ideology and program. The bottom of the first page contained the party and leader 
endorsement, in the form “With Le Pen, Front National”, printed in the largest fonts on the page. 
The Party logo, the tricolor flame was featured next to Front National. Thus, the cover format in 
2007 was consistent with a niche party’s visual strategy, as it contained both the party, and the 
leader’s name, and a significant part of the visual space dedicated to the party’s ideological 
program.  In 2012, in addition to the candidate’s picture, the PF cover contained: a slogan (“Pour 
une Assemblee vraiment Nationale!,” i.e., “For a truly National Assembly”), the candidate’s 
name, the party – “Rassemblement Bleu Marine, Front National” – and the party logo. Contrary 
to a niche party’s visual strategy, there was no mention of ideological positions, and there was 




The data was provided by the CEVIPOF library, an organization that collects campaign 
documents from elections at all levels. Table 1 summarizes the sample of available PFs with 
respect to the entire population of FN candidates in the two elections.  
                                                     
2
 Examples of the covers in each year are pictured in Figure 1.  
3
 There were further differences between the back sides of the PFs in the two years. In 2007, the reverse-side text had 
three headlines. One headline, at the top, listed the key problems faced by France and the French. A second headline, 
immediately below it, was about the main parties on the left and right and their inability to fix these problems. A 
third headline, positioned centrally on the vertical axis, was about the party’s main proposed measures to fix these 
problems. In 2012, the reverse side contained a picture of Marine Le Pen on the top left of the page. Next to the 
picture, there was a message from her headlined by the title “To take care of you, I need you!” On the bottom half 
side of the page, headlined by the title “We will do it!” and by Marine Le Pen’s personal signature, there was a list of 
12 proposals. The bottom of the document called “for the support for candidates of Rassemblement Bleu Marine, 
Front National on June 10.” Front National had the largest font on the page, followed by Rassemblement Bleu 
Marine. The FN party sign, the tricolor flame, was featured on the bottom right corner. In short, the backside 
contained significantly stronger personal appeals in 2012 than in 2007.  
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 [Table 1 here] 
The data availability is influenced by its collection mode by the CEVIPOF. In fact, the 
PFs arrived to the center from private citizens who decided to donate the documents sent to their 
home address. Thus, any gaps in the data are due to the lack of individual volunteers. These gaps 
were more pronounced in 2007 than in 2012. In 2007, only 22 legislative PFs were sent to the 
CEVIPOF; in 2012, there were 94.  As can be seen, in both years, candidates whose PF was 
available at the CEVIPOF performed slightly poorer than those whose PF was not available.
4
 The 
difference in mean electoral scores between those included and those not included is of about half 
a standard deviation of the total population of candidates. There is, however, no overall 
difference in terms of the gender distribution.  
 
b. Visual analysis software and measures 
The PF covers were analyzed using the open-source visual analysis software first used by 
Dumitrescu (2009, 2010).
5
 The analysis focused on the visual presentation of the candidate, as 
illustrated in Figure 1 for both years and both men and women.  
 [Figure 1 here] 
                                                     
4
 For both years the PFs come from several administrative departments, with most candidates in each year running in 
departments in Ile de France. In 2007, the sample covers 10 different departments in metropolitan France (out of 96). 
Nine candidates come from the Paris department (41% of the sample), and seventeen candidates (77% of the sample) 
ran their campaigns in the Ile-de-France region. In 2012, the sample covers 36 departments. The department with the 
most candidates in the sample is Paris (with 14 candidates, or about 15% of the sample). 48% of the sample of 
candidates (N=45) comes from the Ile-de-France region. This geographic distribution may explain why the electoral 
support for the candidates in the sample is below the national average. In 2012, FN candidates in Ile de France 
scored on average about 2 percent lower than the national average. However, there is no reason to suspect that this 
geographic distribution in the data base is determined by anything else than the simple distribution of volunteers who 
wanted (or knew) to send these materials to CEVIFOP, which is itself located in Paris. 
5
 The software is available for free by request.  
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The software determines with pixel level accuracy the location and the size of various 
elements in a picture. The colored areas on each PF in Figure 1 represent the three elements 
analyzed with the software: the entire area taken by the candidate on the cover (in red), the area 
of their head (face and visible hair, in green) and the area of their face (in blue). Each of these 
elements is compared to the entire PF picture (delimited in Figure 1 by a pink line) 
First and foremost, the software computes the areas of these elements in pixels squared. 
To generate comparable measurements across PFs, these areas were transformed so that they all 
represent percentages. For example, a value of 0.4 on the “Entire Candidate Area” indicates 
that the candidate takes 40% of the cover. We also compute two ratio variables: the ratio of the 
candidate’s face to the visible body (“Face over Body Area”), and the ratio of candidate’s head 
to the body (“Head over Body Area”). A value of 0.2 on the “Face over Body Area” variable 
indicates that the face takes 20% of the entire candidate image. These ratio variables indicate how 
close the picture is, with larger ratios indicating greater closeness.   
In addition to the two ratios described above, the variable “Close-Up” also measures how 
close the picture is. It captures the distance between the lowest point of the candidate’s chin and 
the bottom of their entire image. This distance is divided by the height of the cover to produce 
comparable measures, and then it is subtracted from 1. The larger the value, the closer the 
candidate appears. A value of 1 indicates that the candidate’s chin is the lowest body part visible 
on the cover.  
The central position of the candidate on the cover is computed based on the position of 
their face. More specifically, the variable captures the distance between the center of gravity of 
the area taken by their face and the horizontal center of the cover. This distance is divided by the 
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width of the PF cover to produce comparable measures, and then it is subtracted from 1. This 
variable runs theoretically from 0 (indicating that the face is situated precisely on the margin of 
the cover)  to 1 (indicating that the face is precisely in the middle). Larger values on the “Center 
Face Position” variable indicate more closeness to the center.  
The position of the candidate on the vertical axis of the cover is computed based on the 
distance in pixels between the bottom of the PF cover and the top coordinate of the candidate’s 
face. The distance is divided by the height of the PF cover to obtain comparable data. The closer 
to 1 the “Top Face Position” variable is, the more to the top candidates are placed.  
 
Results 
RQ1. We begin by examining the differences in candidates’ visual presentation from 2007 to 
2012. Figure 2 presents the mean measurements of the various presentation features in the two 
samples (with 95% confidence intervals). For each visual feature, it also presents the t-statistic 
for the difference between the two years.
6
 The immediate conclusion of Figure 2 is that, based on 
the observed samples, there has been a complete shift in presentation style, as all the t-statistics of 




[Figure 2 here] 
                                                     
6
 The equality of sample variances assumption was tested for using the sdtest command in Stata 13. The results 
showed it to be violated for two variables: “Entire Candidate Area” and “Top Face Position.” For these variables the 
t-tests account for unequal variances. To increase the confidence in these findings, we also ran a Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney (WMW) test for each variable, to account for the potential non-normality of the data. All the tests pointed to 
a significant difference between the two year samples for all the variables and in the same direction as the t-tests. For 
space considerations, the results from the WMW tests are not reported, but are available by request.  
7
 For all the figures, the tables with the complete means, standard deviations, N and degrees of freedom for the t-
statistics are included in Appendix A. 
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Candidates who wish to attract a personal vote feature themselves larger on their 
promotion materials, closer to the voters, more to the center and more to the top of the picture. 
This is what FN candidates do on average in 2012 compared to 2007. For example, whereas in 
2007 the average observed candidate took about 22% of the entire cover, in 2012, the average 
candidate takes 36%, thereby supporting H1a. Judging by the position of the chin with respect to 
the visible body (expressed in the close-up variable), the closeness of the picture has increased by 
about 42%, thereby supporting H1b. Two more indicators support H1b: the candidate’s face in 
2012 takes about 29% more of the entire image than in 2007, and the candidate’s head takes on 
average 31% more of the image in 2012.  Candidates also occupy a more central position on the 
cover, as determined the position of their face. In support of H1c, in 2012, the deviation from the 
center is about 10 times smaller than in 2007 (the mean shift from the center is of a mere 0.03 in 
2012 and of 0.25 in 2007).  Finally, candidates also place themselves closer to the top of the 
cover in 2012, by about 18%.   
 
RQ2. We next look at how men and women candidates presented themselves in 2007 and 
2012. We particularly expect that women candidates in 2012 visually promote their personal 
qualities more. We first consider the differences between the men and women candidates in 2007, 
then the same differences in 2012, and finally, we combine the two samples to simultaneously 
test for both gender and time variations.  
[Figure 3 here] 
Let us first look at Figure 3 which presents the comparison of the variables of interest by 
gender in 2007. As we can see from graphs and the t-statistics noted below each of them, we 
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observe relatively little difference in the self-presentation of women and men candidates on this 
occasion. Only two differences stand out, and they both indicate that men portray themselves 
closer to voters. For men, the face takes about 34% of the visible body; for women, the 
corresponding percentage is about 24%. Another indicator of closeness, the “Close-Up” variable 
measuring the position of the chin with respect to the bottom of the candidate picture, points in 
the same direction. The value for men is about 22% less than the value for women, indicating that 
men candidates use closer pictures. Thus, men were nonetheless, on average, more likely to 
visually encourage a personal vote in 2007. 
[Figure 4 here] 
The same variable comparisons in 2012 are presented in Figure 4. This time we observe 
significant differences in candidates’ presentation by gender. The visual behavior patterns are 
somewhat reversed when compared to 2007. Women are more likely than men to invite a 
personal vote according to three indicators. First, there is the size of their picture on the cover, 
which is about 8% larger than that of male candidates. Second, their average “Close-Up” value is 
about 15% lower than for male candidates, making them, therefore, appear closer to the viewer. 
And third, the Head over Body Area is also about 24% larger than for male candidates. Two other 
indicators however, suggest that male candidates are more likely to focus the viewer’s attention 
to themselves. The Face over Body Area is on average 10% larger for men; and men are on 
average more likely to picture themselves closer to the top than women (albeit by a very small 
margin). Thus, in 2012 both women and men invited a personal vote, albeit through the use of 
different visual strategies.  
[Table 2 here] 
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To see to what extent the shift in image is robust when comparing both genders and both 
years at the same time, we look at the multivariate regressions in Table 2. At the bottom of each 
model we note which hypotheses were tested, and which were supported.  
Let us first consider how FN women candidates in 2012 differ from FN women 
candidates in 2007 in their visual strategies. As expected from the Figures above, we find full 
support for hypotheses H2a through H2d. FN women candidates’ self-presentation strategy has 
changed dramatically from one election to the next. Women in 2012 are more likely to use all the 
visual presentation features associated with a personal vote: they feature larger on the cover, they 
appear closer to the viewers, more to the center and more to the top of the cover. Men have also 
undergone a similar transformation; but because they were more likely to play on their personal 
image in 2007 (as we have already seen in Figure 3), their visual evolution has been less 
dramatic. The interaction terms in Table 2 express the magnitude of the shift in men vs. women 
self-presentation strategy from 2007 to 2012. These interactions are significant and in the 
expected direction in four of six models, indicating that on these four indicators women have 
made a bigger step towards visual self-advancement.  
We also find some support for the expected differences in men vs. women self-
presentation styles in 2012. Consistent with hypotheses H2e and H2f, women feature larger 
images of themselves and appear closer to viewers in 2012 than their male colleagues.  However, 
as already glimpsed from the simple variable comparisons in Figure 4, they do not outperform 
male politicians on all self-presentation features. They are as likely to place themselves in the 
middle of the cover as male candidates. They are also slightly lower on the cover. Thus, the 
evidence supports H2e and H2f, but not H2g and H2h.  
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The analysis to this point has indicated mostly support for our hypotheses, consistent with 
a shift in FN candidates’ visual self-presentation strategies in 2012 toward a more personal, close 
candidate image, a shift more pronounced for women candidates. Our observations are 
nonetheless based on limited samples, which is why the next section performs several sensitivity 
analyses designed to establish the confidence we can have in these patters with respect to the 
entire candidate population.  
 
Sensitivity analyses  
Gallop and Weschle (2014) have argued that potential case selection biases in small samples can 
generate inference problems. To solve them, they have proposed an approach based on 
simulations of alternative samples with different characteristics. For example, starting from the 
original sample, one can simulate alternative samples with different first moments of the 
distribution (e.g. larger/smaller mean or standard deviation). Since the characteristics of the 
distribution influence the results, then, by observing how the original model performs on such 
simulated samples, one can better estimate the robustness of the findings to sample 
specifications.  
In this section of the paper we consider the possibility that our data is biased in a direction 
that favors our hypotheses. For each of our finding, we simulate several possible alternative 
distributions that go against these hypotheses, and note how the results change with the sample. 
Below, we present this analysis by research question.  
Sensitivity analysis for RQ1. We observed in our samples that candidates use more 
visual self-promotion strategies in 2012 than in 2007. But what if our observations 
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underestimated the true amount of visual self-promotion in 2007? Or conversely, what if we 
overestimated the true amount of self-promotion in 2012?  
To check how robust the findings are to these potential biases, we simulate four 
alternative samples in 2007 whose distributions means are shifted respectively by 0.25, 0.5, 1 and 
2 standard deviations from the original mean in the direction of more self-promotion. These 
simulated distributions assume, therefore, that the 2007 candidates whom we observed as 
moderately to very high on self-promotion are in fact average in the true candidate population 
for those elections. We also simulate another four samples in 2012 whose means are shifted by 
0.25, 0.5, 1 and 2 standard deviations toward less self-promotion. These simulated distributions 
assume, therefore, that the 2012 candidates who in our observed distribution are moderately to 
very low on self-promotion are the average in the true population of 2012 FN candidates. 
[Table 3 here] 
Table 3 presents the analysis results comparing 2007 and 2012 candidates if we assume 
that our observations our biased. On the left side of the table we see how the results change if we 
assume that the true population of 2007 FN candidates relies on more self-promotion than the 
amount we observe. On the right hand side of the table we see how the findings change if the true 
population of candidates in 2012 promotes itself less. The entries are the absolute values of t-
statistics for the group differences, and the color of cells indicate if the finding stays the same 
(green), changes to no differences (no color) or reverses (red).   
The main conclusion of Table 3 is that the differences in self-promotion between 2007 FN 
candidates and their colleagues in 2012 are robust to many potential selection biases. Of the 48 
tests, 36 yield the same results. Only if we assume biases of two standard deviations going 
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against the original finding do the results become weaker (in 7 cases) or change direction (in 5 
cases). Thus, the sensitivity checks reinforce the confidence in the observed pattern toward visual 
self-promotion among FN candidates in 2012 compared to 2007.   
Sensitivity analysis for RQ2. We found before that women FN candidates underwent a 
significant transformation in terms of self-promotion from 2007 to 2012. The differences were 
significant both when we just considered the women candidate population in the two elections, 
and when we compared women to men in each year.  
But what if our samples underestimate or overestimate the amount of visual promotion in 
the population of men and women candidates? In this section we consider how the results change 
if the samples are biased against the original findings.  
For each of the measures we observed differences between men and women candidates in 
2007 and in 2012, we construct eight alternative samples. This takes the number of simulated 
distributions to 56. As in the sensitivity analyses above, these simulated distributions have their 
means shifted with respect to the original distribution to go against the original finding.  
[Table 4a here] 
Table 4a presents the results for the difference between men and women candidates in 
2007 in the simulated data. In the observed data, men tend to visually place themselves closer to 
the viewer. This finding is moderately robust to sample specifications: the significance and sign 
of the difference is the same in 7 tests, the difference disappears in another 7 tests and the finding 
is reversed in 2 cases (if the data significantly overestimates males’ presentation features). 
[Table 4b here] 
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Table 4b presents the results for the difference between men and women candidates in 
2012 using the simulated samples. In the observed data, women are more likely than men to 
visually promote themselves according to three indicators. In the simulated data, the sign and 
significance of the group difference stays the same in 7 alternative specifications; but the 
difference disappears in 9 other specifications, and the findings are reversed if the sample 
significantly overestimates women candidates’ presentation features or significantly 
underestimates those of male candidates (in 8 cases). The least robust finding among the three 
indicators is the one for “Close-Up;” the other two indicators of Entire Candidate Area and Head 
over Body Area are quite robust to different sample specifications. In the observed data, men 
were more likely to promote themselves according to two other indicators, Face over Body Area 
and Top Face Position. In the simulated data, the gender differences disappear in 7 cases, get 
reversed in another 7 and only maintain the sign and significance in 2 cases.  
[Table 4c here] 
Table 4c presents the results from the difference between women candidates in 2007 and 
2012, using simulated samples that account for possible overestimation of self-presentation 
features in 2012 or underestimation of self-presentation features in 2007.  Of the 48 different tests 
accounting for possible biases, 43 reveal the same findings: women candidates in 2012 are 
significantly more likely to visually promote themselves to invite a personal vote.  
The results from the sensitivity analyses reinforce the confidence in the shift in visual 
presentation features from 2007 to 2012, particularly for women candidates.  
 
Discussion 
RUNNING HEAD:  
UP, CLOSE AND PERSONAL: THE NEW FN VISUAL STRATEGY 
26 
 
Marine Le Pen’s success at the helm of the Front National has profoundly shaken the French 
electoral scene. The party and its leader have attracted previously unconceivable high electoral 
support since 2011. Since numerous analyses of the new FN leader’s interventions found mainly 
superficial changes from her father’s discourse, the factors influencing this success are still up for 
debate. While this paper does not directly explain the party’s new electoral fortunes, it does draw 
attention to a previously all but ignored aspect of the party’s communication: the visual 
presentation of its candidates. The results from the analyses leave little doubt as to the significant 
visual transformation that FN legislative candidates’ images underwent since Marine Le Pen took 
direct command of the party.  Specifically, 2012 FN candidates portray themselves significantly 
more like mainstream party candidates. They make visual choices that create the illusion of 
personal closeness to voters, and of personal importance, as they place themselves larger, more 
central and more to the top of their electoral materials. Thus, they use the visual tools to demand 
not just a party vote, but a personal vote as well. Women candidates have, in particular, 
undergone a significant transformation from 2007. In some respects they visually promote 
themselves more than men – for example, when it comes to the size of their picture. Thus, this 
paper finds substantial changes in the FN party’s visual strategy, reflecting the promises (not 
carried out in the policy domain) made by Marine Le Pen to open up the party more to women, a 
previously shunned category of voters, and to transform the party into a worthy contender for the 
power. Importantly, the sensitivity checks suggest that many of these patterns are robust, despite 
our access to small samples in each year.  
This project raises new questions for investigation. First, further study should be devoted 
to the relation between the visual image that candidates want to convey and their actual role in 
the party organization. The party candidates’ self-centered visual appeal clashes with the strong 
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hold that Marine Le Pen (like her father before her) is known to have on all the organizational 
aspects of the party. Second, the within-year and between-years variation in candidates’ 
presentation styles raises questions as to the role played by visuals in FN candidates’ success at 
the polls. Unfortunately, the contextual data needed for investigating this question (for example, 
candidate-specific data beyond gender; constituency-specific variables; local-campaign specific 
variables) is very hard to find for the previous years. Thus, it is hoped that more light will be set 
on this relationship in the upcoming legislative elections. A third question concerns the extent of 
the changes in the party’s visual strategy. This article finds strong evidence of promotion 
strategies consistent with those of a mainstream party in documents that by definition, reach 
virtually every voter in France. However, voters’ exposure to the candidates’ PFs is brief and 
occurs only before the election. By this time, the average citizen may have arguably been 
exposed to substantially more visual information about the FN leader and her party through TV 
reports of her interventions. Given the rich informative content of TV visuals (e.g., Grabe & 
Bucy, 2009; Dumitrescu, 2016), significantly more research should be devoted to analyzing TV 
footage of the Marine Le Pen and the party’s candidates, and in investigating the impact of their 
visual presentation on voters’ opinions.  The results in this paper open up, therefore, a rich 
research agenda that can help lead to a better understanding of the evolution of France’s main far-
right party.     
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Figure 1. Example of analyzed PF covers 
Note. The red selection indicates the area taken by the candidate’s entire image on the cover, the green 
selection indicates the area taken by their head, and the blue selection indicates the area taken by their 
face. The entire area of the PF cover is marked with a pink border.  
  
PF HEIGHT  
PF WIDTH  
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Figure 2. Candidate visual presentation differences from 2007 to 2012 
Note. All the variables are coded so that larger values indicate a stronger candidate visual focus (see text 









































































Top Face Position by Year
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Figure 3. Visual presentation differences between men and women candidates in 2007 
Note. All the variables are coded so that larger values indicate a stronger candidate visual focus (see text 








































































Top Face Position in 2007
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Figure 4. Visual presentation differences between men and women candidates in 2012 
Note. All the variables are coded so that larger values indicate a stronger candidate visual focus (see text 








































































Top Face Position in 2012
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Table 1. The sample of professions de foi 

























Std. dev. 4.87 6.40 1.02 2.06 4.36 6.02 
       
Female (%) 54.31 48.26 45.45 48.97 56.38 47.46 
       
Superscripts indicate significant differences in variable means by year.  
a
 Indicates a significant difference at p<0.05 (two-tailed). 
b
 indicates a significant difference at p<0.10 (two-tailed) 
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Female 0.01    -0.04**    -0.10**    -0.02    0.01    0.02    
 (0.01) (0.02)     (0.03) (0.04)     (0.01)     (0.02) 
Election year 2012 0.12**    0.03**    0.06**    0.07**    0.23**    0.13**    
 (0.01)     (0.01)     (0.03)      (0.03)      (0.01) (0.01) 
Female * Election year 2012 0.02*    0.06**    0.06**    0.15**    -0.02    -0.04    
 (0.01) (0.02)     (0.03)      (0.04) (0.01)      (0.02) 
Constant 0.22**    0.81**    0.34**    0.50**    0.74**    0.63**    
 (0.00)     (0.01)     (0.02)     (0.03)     (0.01) (0.01) 
       
R squared 0.77 0.30 0.30 0.43 0.93 0.64 
F(3, 112) 236.48 22.65 46.41 36.77 664.97 124.11 
P>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 
N 116 116 116 116 116 116 















Linear regression results with robust standard errors computed in Stata 13.  
All the dependent variables are coded so that larger values indicate a stronger candidate visual focus (see text for 
additional variable description).  
**Indicates significance at p<0.05 (two-tailed), *p<0.10 (two-tailed).  
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presentation features in 2007 
Observed data 
OVERESTIMATES personal 
presentation features in 2012 
 Simulated shifts in true mean Simulated shifts in true mean 
 2 SD 1 SD 0.5 SD 0.25 SD 0.25 SD 0.5 SD 1 SD 2 SD 
Entire Candidate Area  14.66** 18.44**  20.34** 21.29** 20.80** 19.38**   16.52**  10.80** 
Close-Up 2.37** 1.73*    3.78**   4.80** 4.77**   3.70** 1.58  2.67** 
Face over Body Area   4.51**   0.18    2.53**   3.70**    3.85**   2.82** 0.76  3.34** 
Head over Body Area   0.98   2.36**    4.04**   4.87**    4.61**   3.51** 1.31  3.08** 
Center Face Position  30.23** 34.31** 36.35** 37.37** 37.33** 36.26** 34.13** 29.88** 
Top Face Position    0.79   5.31** 7.56** 8.70**  9.16** 8.50** 7.18**  4.54** 
Notes. 
The entries represent absolute t-statistic values for the difference between groups (df=114). The t-tests for the “Entire 
Candidate Area” and “Top Face Position” account for the inequality of variances between the samples.  
The cell color indicates the direction of the finding in the simulated data: green if it matches the original observed 
one, red if it goes against it, and no color for no group difference.  
**Indicates significance at p<0.05 (two-tailed), *p<0.10 (two-tailed) 
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Table 4a. Gender-based comparison of self-promotion differences in 2007 in simulated data. 
 Observed data  
UNDERESTIMATES women 
candidates’ personal presentation 
features  
Observed data  
OVERESTIMATES men 
candidates’ personal presentation 
features 
 Simulated shifts in true mean Simulated shifts in true mean 
 2 SD 1 SD 0.5 SD 0.25 SD 0.25 SD 0.5 SD 1 SD 2 SD 
Close-Up 1.51 0.50 1.51 2.01* 1.87* 1.23 0.05 2.62** 
Face over Body Area 1.37 2.65** 3.29** 3.62** 3.15** 2.35** 0.77 2.39 ** 
Notes. 
The entries represent absolute t-statistic values for the difference between groups (df=20). The t-tests for the “Face 
over Body Area” take into account the inequality of variances between the samples.   
The cell color indicates the direction of the finding in the simulated data: green if it matches the original observed 
one, red if it goes against it, and no color for no group difference.  
**Indicates significance at p<0.05 (two-tailed), *p<0.10 (two-tailed) 
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Table 4b. Gender-based comparison of self-promotion differences in 2012 in simulated data. 
 Observed data  
UNDERESTIMATES men  
candidates’ personal presentation 
features  
Observed data  
OVERESTIMATES women  
candidates’ personal presentation  
features 
 Simulated shifts in true mean Simulated shifts in true mean 
  2 SD 1 SD  0.5 SD  0.25 SD  0.25 SD  0.5 SD    1 SD    2 SD 
Entire Candidate Area  4.47**    0.13   2.05**  3.14** 2.94**    1.65    0.91 6.04** 
Close-Up 7.45**    2.56**   0.12  1.11  1.14    0.04    2.42** 7.16** 
Head over Body Area 3.89**    1.17   3.70** 4.97** 5.08**    3.93**    1.63 2.97** 
 Observed data  
UNDERESTIMATES women 
candidates’ personal presentation 
features  
Observed data  
OVERESTIMATES men  
candidates’ personal presentation  
features 
 Simulated shifts in true mean Simulated shifts in true mean 
 2 SD 1 SD 0.5 SD 0.25 SD 0.25 SD 0.5 SD 1 SD 2 SD 
Face over Body Area 7.14** 2.16** 0.33 1.57 1.67* 0.53 1.76* 6.33** 
Top Face Position 8.21** 2.73** 0.01 1.38 1.70* 0.64 1.47 5.678** 
Note: The entries represent absolute t-statistic values for the difference between groups (df=92). The cell color 
indicates the direction of the finding in the simulated data: green if it matches the original observed one, red if it goes 
against it, and no color for no group difference. The t-tests for the “Top Face Position” take into account the inequality 
of variances between the samples.  **Indicates significance at p<0.05 (two-tailed), *p<0.10 (two-tailed) 
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Table 4c. Year-based comparison of self-promotion differences among women only in simulated data. 
 Observed data  
UNDERESTIMATES women 
candidates’ personal presentation 
features in 2007 
Observed data  
OVERESTIMATES women 
candidates’ personal presentation  
features in 2012 
 Simulated shifts in true mean Simulated shifts in true mean 
 2 SD 1 SD 0.5 SD 0.25 SD 0.25 SD 0.5 SD 1 SD 2 SD 
Entire Candidate Area  7.17** 9.77** 11.07** 11.72** 11.63** 10.90** 9.42** 6.47** 
Close-Up 1.85* 4.16** 5.31** 5.89** 5.72** 4.97** 3.48** 0.48 
Face over Body Area 3.91** 6.22** 7.38** 7.95** 7.29** 6.05** 3.56** 1.40 
Head over Body Area 3.00** 5.00** 6.00** 6.51** 6.25** 5.49** 3.98** 0.95 
Center Face Position 16.66** 19.75** 21.30** 22.07** 22.13** 21.41** 19.98** 17.12** 
Top Face Position 2.26** 0.84 2.40** 3.17** 3.61** 3.27** 2.58** 1.22 
Note: The entries represent absolute t-statistic values for the difference between groups (df=61). The cell color 
indicates the direction of the finding in the simulated data: green if it matches the original observed one, red if it goes 
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Note: the Tables are numbered to reflect the number of the Figure in the text that they complement 
(there is no Table A1) 
 
 













 Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. |t|   
        
Entire Candidate Area  0.22 0.02 0.36 0.03  22.23** H1a Yes 
Close-Up 0.21 0.04 0.15 0.05 5.83** H1b Yes 
Face over Body Area 0.29 0.08 0.38     0.07     4.87** H1b Yes 
Head over Body Area 0.49 0.09     0.64     0.12    5.71** H1b Yes 
Center Face Position 0.75     0.02     0.97 0.02    38.39** H1c Yes 
Top Face Position 0.64 0.05 0.75 0.03  9.82** H1d Yes 
Notes.  
**Indicates significance at p<0.05 (two-tailed). 
The variables are coded so that larger values indicate a stronger candidate visual focus.  
The equality of sample variances was checked for each variable using the sdtest command in Stata 13. Sample 
variances were found to be different by year for the “Entire Candidate Area” and “Top Face Position” variables, and 
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 Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. |t|  
Entire Candidate Area  0.22     0.02     0.23     0.03     0.73 No difference 
Close-Up 0.81     0.04     0.77     0.03     2.51** Men 
Face over Body Area 0.34     0.08     0.24     0.03     3.94** Men 
Head over Body Area 0.50    0.11     0.48 0.06       0.51 No difference 
Center Face Position 0.74     0.02       0.75     0.03     1.04 No difference 
Top Face Position 0.63         0.02 0.65 0.07   0.91  No difference 
Notes.  
**Indicates significance at p<0.05 (two-tailed). * Indicates significance at p<0.10 (two-tailed).  
The variables are coded so that larger values indicate a stronger candidate visual focus.  
The equality of sample variances was checked for each variable using the sdtest command in Stata 13. Sample 
variances were found to be different by candidate gender for the “Entire Candidate Area,” “Face over Body Area” 
and “Top Face Position” variables, and the t-tests for these variables take into account the inequality of variances 
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Table A4. Visual presentation differences between men and women candidates in 2012 (Complement 


















Entire Candidate Area  0.34      0.03    0.37     0.03     4.22** Women 
Close-Up 0.84     0.05     0.86     0.04     2.33** Women 
Face over Body Area 0.40    0.07     0.36 0.07     2.82** Men 
Head over Body Area 0.57     0.10     0.69     0.09     6.23** Women 
Center Face Position 0.98     0.02     0.97    0.03     1.49 No difference 
Top Face Position 0.76     0.03 0.74 0.03 2.75** Men 
Notes.  
**Indicates significance at p<0.05 (two-tailed).  
The variables are coded so that larger values indicate a stronger candidate visual focus.  
The equality of sample variances was checked for each variable using the sdtest command in Stata 13. 
Sample variances were found to be different by candidate gender for the “Top Face Position” variable, and 
the t-test for it takes into account the inequality of variances between the two samples. 
 
 
